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Case No.
7455

Brief of Appellants
This suit was brought by the Town of North Salt
Lake to condemn the water rights and water system of
St. Joseph Water and Irrigation Company, a public
utility. The complaint also asked for the condemnation
1
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of a 600 feet pipeline extension. (R. 5) The complaint alleged that L. W. Gibbs claimed ownership of this 600
feet extension. (R. 5) Gibbs claims in his answer that
he and his wife owned it jointly, (R. 38) and his wife,
Mary Godbe Gibbs, claimed joint ownership in her complaint in intervention. (R. 48)
This 600 feet extension was only part of a 2400 feet
pipeline system constructed by the appellants Gibbs to
connect the St. Joseph Water system with an area which
was being developed by them for a housing project. (R.
187-93, Ex. 5) The Gibbs, before building the pipeline,
had applied to St. Joseph for 60 water connections. This
application had been accepted and approved by St.
Joseph and the connection charge of $20.00 each had been
paid on forty of these accepted applications. (R. 199, Ex.
8) Thereafter this 2400 feet extension line was constructed at a cost in excess of $4,000.00. (R. 190-3) Other homes
were in the process of construction and several building
lots had been sold. (R. 195, 349)
Thereafter a group of individuals who also were
being served with culinary water by St. Joseph caused
the Town of North Salt Lake to be incorporated. The incorporated limits of the Town were so fixed that all of
the Gibbs development was excluded from the Town.
(R. 10) Then this action was brought to condemn the
water rights and water system of St. Joseph. The complaint also sought to condemn 600 feet of the pipeline
extension of the Gibbs. The balance of some 1800 feet of
the Gibbs extension was not sought to be condemned.
(R. 186-8).
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:J

-,

The Gibbs opposed the condemnation suit on the
grounds that the property was already devoted to the
highest public use. (R. 40, 50) They also contended that
if the town were to be permitted to take that portion of
the water supply and water system devoted to serve the
Town area, that in any event the portion of the water and
the water system available to serve the areas outside the
Town could not be taken and the rights of those located
outside the _Town had to be protected. (R. 40, 50) The
eourt did require continued delivery of 6,000 gallons of
water per day to the six completed homes, but permitted
the Town to condemn all of the water rights and the
system. (R. 127) Those living outside the Town were
given rights to use the excess capacity of the system,
(not the water) but this can better be noted in detail
elsewhere. (R. 128)
The Gibbs, after having had the court determine
that the waters and system could be taken by eminent
domain without obligation to furnish water to the Gibbs
attempted to prove their damages, contending : ( 1) that
the contract for sixty connections, for which they had
paid $800.00, and the 600 feet of pipeline which the complaint sought to condemn, both had value which the jury
should be permitted to assess; (2) that the remainder of the pipeline extension, consisting of 1800 feet,
which was not to be taken, would be damaged by reason
of the severance of it from the St. Joseph system; and
(3) that when the Gibbs laid out their housing project,
the area developed was within the St. Joseph franchise
area, that they had a firm contract for sixty connections,
had in reliance on that contract commenced construction
3
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of houses, paid engineering fees, purchased the land, etc.,
all of which value was lost by reason of the waters being
taken from the housing project. (R. 30-50)
At the close of a three-day trial, the court ruled that
the plaintiff did not need to take the 600 feet, and then
held as a matter of law that the Gibbs were not to any
extent damaged. The Town was permitted to take all
the water and the water system, and the Gibbs were given
nothing for their contract rights, for which they had
paid the $800.00 connection charge. Mary Godbe Gibbs
was permitted to intervene by Judge Cowley, but after
the foregoing ruling, Judge Hendricks dismissed the complaint in intervention. (R. 355) Later when judgment
was entered, (R. 124) the decree was that there was "no
cause of action" for the interveners. It is not now known
whether the prior dismissal or the later judgment of no
cause of action was intended to control. In any event, the
court held that the Gibbs were entitled to no water nor
connections, and that they had suffered no ·damages. It
is from this judgment that the Gibbs appeal.
The amount assessed by the jury as damages to St.
Joseph was acceptable both to the Town and to St.
Joseph, and the judgment has been paid. This phase of
the case, is therefore, of no concern here.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ON POINTS RELIED
ON IN THE APPEAL
I. The Gibbs had an interest in the St. Joseph
system which: (a) could not be taken by condemnation,
because it was already devoted to the highest public use;
and (b) if it be held that the Gibbs are wrong in this con-
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tention, then in any event the interest of the Gibbs which
was taken had a value which the jury should have been
permitted to assess.
II. Since the Gibbs had constructed a pipeline extension pursuant to an existing contract with St. Joseph
and had made other improvements, they were entitled to
damages when the pipeline extension was severed from
the system of St. Joseph and thus left ·without water.
III. It was error to permit the Town to dismiss its
action to condemn the 600 feet extension after the close of
the trial, in that: (a) The Town had held possession
under an order of immediate occupancy for over seven
months, and Gibbs was enjoined from interfering with it,
all without compensation; and (b) the Gibbs had been
required to protect their interest, adduce evidence, and
in any event should have been allowed their costs when
the Town decided at the close of the trial not to condemn.
IV. The jury should have been permitted to determine: (a) whether or not the property of the Gibbs was
within the St. Joseph franchise area; and (b) whether
or not there was surplus water to fulfill the Gibbs contract for new connections.
V. It was error to permit the City to furnish water
to six users at city rates through the Gibbs pipeline without paying the Gibbs therefor.
THE FACTS
The St. Joseph Water and Irrigation Company was
a public service corporation, engaged in the distribution
and sale of culinary water. (R. 8 and 128) Its lines ran
5
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north along the west side of Highway 91, (the OgdenSalt Lake highway) beginning at a point near the Salt
Lake-Davis County line. Most of the users of the water
were located west of that highway, but there were also
users to the east. (R. 35 and 36) To show that the Gibbs
land was within the franchise area, the Gibbs showed
that up until the time of their application for sixty new
connections the company had served all applicants (east
or west of the road) adjacent to its pipelines. (R. 19)
They had not within the president's memory ever refused
connections. (R. 36) The president of the company described the area served as including the Gibbs land. (R.
18-19) The company had previously had a dispute over
its franchise area. It complained to the Public Service
Commission of Utah that the O'Dell Water Company,
which served the area to the north of the St. Joseph area,
had infringed on the St. Joseph area by furnishing water
to one house located east of Highway 91, and one house
located west of said highway. (R. 102) A hearing had
been held before the Public Service Commission on this
complaint. As a result of that hearing the Public Service
Commission entered an order describing the north boundary of the St. Joseph system. The order described the
north boundary as extending both east and west of said
highway 91. (R. 100, Ex. 304) The disputed O'Dell connections were in the St. Joseph territory both east of
the highway and west of the highway. (R. 102) The
Public Service Commission order did not fix the east
boundary or the west boundary of the St. Joseph system,
but it did describe the north boundary, beginning at a
point considerably east of all the Gibbs properties de-

,;~
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scribed herein. The Gibbs property adjoins U. S. I-Iighway 91 on the east and lies to the extreme north end of
the St. Joseph territory, as described in the Public Service Commission's order. (R. 20, Ex. 3 & 4, R. 102) There
was evidence to the effect that the land (Elias Parkin
corner) owned now by intervener Dora Squires (purchased from the Gibbs tract) had once had a water connection. (R. 36) There had never been any applications
made which had been refused. (R. 36)
Mary Godbe Gibbs purchased land in this area, and
a housing project was organized and construction commenced. (R. 183) Before commencing construction the
Gibbs had applied in December, 1945, for sixty connections and had paid $800.00 in full payment for forty of
these sixty connections. (R. 199) The application for the
sixty connections was accepted and approved by St.
Joseph. (R. 199) The Gibbs then under contract with
St. Joseph constructed a pipeline extension from the St.
Joseph system across U. S. Highway 91, into the area
being developed as a housing project. (R. 214) The evidence shows that in excess of $4,000.00 was expended on
this pipeline (R. 192-3) It was stipulated that the first
126 feet of this pipeline had a value of $750.00. (R. 353)
At the time of these Gibbs applications for sixty connections (1945) St. Joseph had two springs. One had a
flow fixed by one witness at 27 gallons per minute. (R.
63) The other had a flow of about five gallons per minute.
(R. 74) The jury thus could have found that these two
springs had a combined flow of 32 gallons per minute.
In addition the company leased water from the McDuff
Springs which had a flow fixed at about forty gallons
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per minute, (R. 109) A normal family of four or five
persons with lawn, shrubs, and normal household use
will use about 1,000 gallons of water per day during the
summertime when lawns are watered. (R. 126) By simple
mathematics, it can be determined that a flow of one
gallon per minute will yield 1440 gallons per day. The
water of St. Joesph, plus the McDuff leased water would
thus have furnished water for 105 connections during the
summertime when the use was high. Richards, who only
measured the McNiel Spring as it flowed into the reservoir, (and thus missed some five gallons per minute
which wasted) testified that the combined flow which
he had measured would furnish water for 97 families.
(R. 110) The five gallons per minute which he did not
measure would have furnished water for eight more families. At the time of the trial there were only sixty four
connections, (Ex. 1, R. 4) eleven of which had been permitted to connect after the applications by the Gibbs.
(Ex. 10) Therefore, at the time (December) 1945, the
Gibbs applied for sixty connections there were only fifty
three users, and the water supply would serve 105
families, even at the periods of heaviest use.
Further, an application had been filed with the State
Engineer by Ward Holbrook, president of the St. Joseph,
for a well. The application expressly stated on page 2:
''The supply of water coming from sources
owned by the St. Joseph Co. and also leased to the
St. Joseph Co. do not appear adequate to supply
the needs of applicant and of other customers now
connected and the numerous consumers seeking
service from the company. In the event this application is approved and the contemplated well pro-
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duces sufficient water, the entire flow will be used
for the primary purposes heretofore set forth, if
such becomes necessary to supply customers requesting service from said St. Joseph Water &
Irrigation Co.''
This application was approved on February 25, 1947,
and the well had been drilled with a flow of some 250
gallons per minute, or enough water to supply some 360
connections. This application was filed on April 30, 1946.
(Ex. 14) Thus at the time the controversy arose, this
well would have furnished a full water right for an additional 360 homes and thus more than have supplied the
Gibbs application for sixty connections. Thereafter, the
company and Holbrook made a written agreement for
the use of the well for ten cents per 1,000 gallons pumped
into the company lines. (R. 221) It was agreed by Holbrook and St. Joseph that a rate increase was necessary
to permit repair to the system and to acquire water from
the new well. (R. 222) The company had shown no profits
for a number of years, and the pipeline system was badly
in need of repair. (R. 222) An application was made for
a rate increase. (R. 222) This was opposed by the people
who later formed the Town of North Salt Lake. (R. 222)
The Commission never made a ruling on this application
in the more than two years between the date of the application and this trial. (R. 222)
The Gibbs discontinued further development in the
housing project while this dispute pended. (R. 202) but
prior thereto over $4,000.00 had been expended on pipelines, (R. 192-3) at least ten homes were constructed, (R.
195) and other sums were expended, (R. 193) and building
lots were sold. (R. 195) The applications for the sixty
9
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connections were still in good standing, and the water
from the Holbrook well was available.
After the Gibbs had made these expenditures and
had· their applications approved· by the company, the
Public Service Commission investigated the question of
availability of water. It noted that a well was contemplated (p. 3 of Ex. 10) but not yet drilled; that the
MeN eil Spring was at least temporarily unfit for use,
and that the :McDuff water might be lost, and that in view
of this there might not be sufficient water. It, therefore,
concluded that it should prohibit new connections "until
the company has been able to determine adequately what
its future supply will be." ( p. 5) It ordered: (1) that the
tunnel to the MeN eil Spring be cleaned and repaired; (2)
that St. Joseph discontinue new connections "pending
completion of arrangements for an adequate suppy of
water in the future" except that five users, plus the six
homes in the Gibbs lands were to be connected. (p. 7 of
Ex. 10) It is to be noted that the five persons ordered
to be connected applied after the application for sixty
connections were made by Gibbs.
The MeN eil spring had been declared unfit, the McDuff lease was about to expire, (Ex. 10) and the well had
not yet been drilled. It was because of these uncertainties that the Public Service Commission prohibited new
connections (R. Ex. lO) Throughout the trial the plaintiff asserted that the Public Service Commission had
determined that the water suply was all in use and that
it was inadequate to fill the needs of Gibbs. This is not
correct. It merely concluded that the supply was uncer10
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·:WI

j
;i

tain, and prohibited connections until the uncertainties
could be cleared. (R. Ex. 10, p. 4-5,7)
In the meantime, because of motives not material
here, one part of the franchise area·of St. Joseph was incorporated into a town (North Salt Lake) and the town
brought action to take over all of the water and the
system. (p. 1-3)
The property owners excluded from the town sought
to intervene. Judge Cowley permitted the intervention of
some, (p. 44) but Judge Hendricks dismissed them and
denied all others the right to intervene. He then proceeded to protect the rights of the six home owners who had
been using water under the Public Service Commission
order. (R. 353-5) However, they were not parties. They
were given 6,000 gallons per day at town rates, (R. 354)
and were given the right to use the Gibbs pipeline to get
water to their lands from the St. Joseph system. They
were not required to pay anything for either the water
rights or the pipeline.
The Gibbs were denied any damages for their
$4,000.00 pipeline and four houses were left without
water. (R. 353-5) The $800.00 which they paid for the
sixty connections was confiscated and they were denied
the right either to have the connections or to be paid for
their loss.
POINT I
THE APPELLANTS GIBBS HAD AN INTEREST
IN THE ST. JOSEPH SYSTE11: WHICH COULD
NOT BE TAI{EN BY CONDEMNATION BECAUSE
11
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THE PROPERTY WAS ALREADY DEVOTED TO
THE HIGHEST PUBLIC USE
It must be kept in mind that the Gibbs had sixty connections applied for, approved and paid for, that they
had made six connections, completed a pipeline extension
into the property being developed and had houses under
construction. They thus stand on a stronger footing than
those whose desire for water connections had not been
formulated or approved prior to the commencement of
this suit. It is our position that these rights, based on an
existing contract, must in all events be given protection.
The right of a city to acquire a water system by
eminent domain must be conceded. Section 15-7-4, U.C.A.
1943. Yet in exercising that right the city is controlled by
the general statutes governing eminent domain proceedings. If this were not so, then there would be no procedure prescribed, and the right of eminent domain
would have to be denied. See Lone Star Gas v. Fort
vVorth, 98 S.W. (2d) 799, 128 Texas 392; annotation
109 A.L.R. 384.
By section 104-6-3, the particular private property
which may be taken is enumerated. It is there provided.
''The private property which may be taken
includes • • *
"(3) property appropriated to public use;
provided that such property shall not be taken
unless for a more necessary public use than that
to which it has already been appropriated."
''As a general rule, property already devoted to a
public use can not be taken for another public use which
12
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will totally destroy or materially interfere with the
former use, unless the intention of the legislature that it
should be so taken has been manifested in express terms
or by necessary implication, mere general authority to
exercise the power of eminent domain being in such
case insufficient; * * * The rule also applies to property
about to be lawfully appropriated, although the appropriation is not completed.'' 29 C.J.S. 862; VermontHydro Electric Corporation v. Dunn, 112 Atl. 223, 95
Yermont 14-1:, 12 A.L.R. 1495. But ·where it is expressly
authorized so to do, the city may take property already
devoted to a public use if under Section 104-61-3 the proposed use is a higher use. But it can not, as is attempted
here, take service away from one territory or area (the
area outside the town) for exclusive use in the town, for
such would not be a higher use.
One of the early cases dealing with this problem is
Mono Power Co. v. City of Los Angeles, C.C.A. Cal., 284
Fed. 794; certiorari denied 43 S. Ct. 700, 262 U. S. 751,
67 L. Ed. 1214. There the Mono Power Company was a
public corporation furnishing power to the inhabitants
of several cities, towns and counties. It furnished no
power to the City of Los Angeles. Los Angeles brought
a condemnation proceeding to condemn all of the property of the power company and to thus deprive the inhabitants of the territories being served of power service.
The court expressly noted that the problem was not merely whether one town could condemn property serving the
inhabitants of another town. Rather it was a question
of the collective inhabitants of the territory served, including the county areas. See page 793.
13
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The statute involved was very close to our Section
104-61-3 (3). The Court held that the property being
devoted to serve the collective inhabitants of other areas
by a public service company could not be taken by the
City of Los Angeles. As noted above, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed this decision by denying
certiorari.
Later in the case of East Bay Municipal Utility District v. Railroad Commission, 229 Pac. 949, 194 Cal. 603, a
slightly different fact situation was presented. There,
like here, a public service company served areas both
within and outside the municipal district. The district
sought to condemn all of the properties of the public
service company, but it proposed to continue to serve
the territory located outside the municipal district. Emphasis is placed on the fact that it did not merely propose
to serve the present users located outside the district.
Rather, it proposed to continue to serve the same "territory", but merely to change the ownership from a private
to a public entity. On page 956 of the Pacific Reporter
the court said that:
"It is proposed to continue the use of the
water to the same territory to which it has heretofore been appropriated. The territory and the
people are not to be disturbed in the use to which
the water is now put and are to enjoy an uninterrupted use thereof.''

The court also said :
"The change will result not in the disturbance of the use or appropriation of water, but in
the agency authorized by law to administer the
trust.''
14
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In an early California case, City of South Pasadena
v. Pasadena Land and Water Co1npany, 152 California
579, 93 Pac. 490, a public water company attempted to sell
all of its water and its distribution system to a city.
About two-thirds of its consumers resided inside the city,
and approximately one-third resided outside the city.
Those residing outside the city sought a.n injunction to
prohibit the sale by the public utility to the city. It is
thought that this case is very close in point, because the
city could take no more by eminent domain proceedings
than the company could voluntarily sell-for eminent
domain is a compulsory sale. The court held that the
public utility could sell all of its facilities to the city,
but it further held that the city received the .property
subject to the same trust and duties as were imposed
upon the utility. It expressly protected the rights of
those persons outside the city who may "become
entitled'' to make future connections. In so holding the
court said:
''The respondent is a quasi public corporation engaged in supplying water for public use.
This is admitted, and it is also conceded that corporations of that character can not, without legislative sanction, transfer to another the entire
property devoted to public service and the business of carrying it on * * *
"It is urged that the effect of a transfer, such
as that here proposed, would relieve the defendant
corporation of its duty to continue the service of
supplying water, wliich is imposed upon it by reason of its control of the water and its enjoyment
of the constitutional franchise to use the streets
for its pipelines, a.nd that there would be no corresponding transfer of the duty to the transferee
15
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of the property, the city of Pasadena, • • • T~e
section does not forbid the transfer of a franchise
so as to relieve the previous owner thereof, or
the grantee or lessee, personally, from liability
incurred in the operation of the franchise, if such
a thing were possible. It merely forbids the transfer of a franchise 'so as to relieve the franchise,
or property held thereunder' from liabilities so
incurred or contracted, • "" •
"It appears from the complaint that for
many years the defendant company has been
supplying water to portions of the two cities, precisely as it does now, the area supplied in South
Pasadena being about two-thirds of its territory,
that more than three hundred families are now
supplied therein from this source, and that if they
are now deprived thereof, there is no other known
source from which it can be replaced, and they
would be without water for any purpose. It may
well be assumed that Pasadena could obtain no
sufficient quantity of water for a municipal water
system, except by buying or condemning that portion of the water of the defendant company now
distributed to its inhabitants, or some other supply already devoted to use outside the city. _It
would be bad policy under these conditions torequire a city, desiring to acquire water for its inhabitants to take water in use by others for similar purposes outside its limits, where the effect
would be to devastate and depopulate such outside territory. To condemn the individual right of
each member of the outside community would be
impracticable, and even if it could legally be done
it would probably prove too costly for the resources of the city. To separate the supply and
endeavor to control, manage, and if necessary
develop and increase the supply from time to time,
in concert or partnership with some other corpora-
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tion, would probably cause many complications,
and render the successful administration of the
municipal system much more difficult and doubtful. In order to nrromplish the purpose for which
these powers were given, it is reasonably certain
that it would be advisable, and it might be necessary, for the rity to take over a supply already
partly in use outside, and continue the service to
the outside territory, while supply the remainder
to the use of its own people * * * Having taken
over the whole system subject to the burden of
supplying part of the water to the inhabitants of
South Pasadena, the city of Pasadena will have no
greater rights or powers, respecting that part of
the service than its grantor previously had. It
will be under the same obligation as its grwntor to
continue the service and to supply the water to all
persons who may become entitled to it in the
future, so long as it retains possession and control of the property so charged * * * The city will
not sell its surplus * * * in the sense intended by
the statute. The right to the use of the required
quantity of this water is now vested in the city of
South Pasadena, and its inhabitants within the
portion of its territory where it is to be served
and the City of Pasadena does not propose to take
away this right. It is about to buy only the right
of the Pasadena Land & Water Company to the
water which did not include this use. It will be
obligated to put it to the same use as fully as
that company is now compelled to do so. Water
which is in this manner dedicated to the use of
an outside community, can not be at the same time
surplus water subject to sale to others. The sale
is already, in effect accomplished. The City of
Pasadena, with respect to this part of the water
will hold title as a mere trustee, bound to apply
it to the use of these beneficially interested.
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This is one of the earliest California cases. The
later cases which are cited and discussed above frequently
speak of the duty of the city to supply water to the
"territory" or "area" previously served by the private
water company whose property was condemned. Here
the town has throughout this proceeding argued that its
duty is only to those persons who already had water connections and were actually using water, that its duty
ceased when it furnished them with the quantity of water
which they were using at the time the suit was brought.
They have contended that the right to make new connections in the future rests entirely with the members of the
town, and that the territory previously served by St.
Joseph can make no increased use, nor have any new
connections. This idea is expressly negative by the Pasadena case. The court on page "956 of the Pacific reporter
expressly said that the city in taking over the private
water company would be obligated to supply not only the
existing needs, but "it will be under the same obligation
as its grantor to continue the service and to supply the
water to all persons who may become entitled to it in the
future, so long as it retains possession and control of the
property so charged," citing Fellows v. Los Angeles, another California case. It seems crystal clear to us that
this property, which was devoted to a public service, became charged with a public trust. As is discussed in the
next subdivision, this corporation, the St. Joseph, could
not have taken the property from this public trust. Counsel for the town repeatedly asserted this proposition in
the trial in an attempt to hold down the money damages.
They objected time and again to questions designed to
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ascertain the Yalue of this property for purposes other
than supplying water to the inhabitants of the town and
said that: "this water is already devoted to a public service, and it can not be used for anything else.'' Having
thus gained their point, they now argue that by this condemnation suit they freed this property from part of the
public trust, to wit, the duty of supplying service to the
franchise area. While the cases dealing squarely with
this point are not numerous, those which are available
sustain the position taken by appellants that this property, insofar as it was supplying the needs of persons
who reside outside the town was already devoted to the
highest public use and could not be taken by eminen~
domain, except subject to the same trust. As said by the
court in the South Pasadena case, the trust which was
imposed upon the property was such as to permit those
in the franchise area who "may become entitled" to use
water in the future to make their water connections.
These appellants would have had no particular complaint had the trial court compelled the Town to honor
the approved applications for 60 connections which the
St. Joseph had agreed to and had undertaken to serve.
But this court refused to do. It gave only limited protection to the six persons who were actually using water.
It limited them forever to 6,000 gallons per day, and all
of the other territory outside the town was forever
denied the right to any water. This holding abolished the
contract rights of the Gibbs with St. Joseph.
It simply can not be that it is a higher public use for
an inhabitant of the Town of North Salt Lake to have a
drink of water, than it is for an inhabitant living imme-
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diately outside the town boundary. Both of said inhabitants were within the St. Joseph franchise area. By section 100-1-5 all uses of water are made public uses. Under
the general law already clearly established here in Utah
any inhabitant of the franchise area could have compelled St. Joseph to allow it to connect on to the system.
See Home Owners Loan v. Logan City, 97 Utah 235 at
242, 92 P. ( 2d) 346. Had the system continued in the
ownership of St. Joseph and water were available, the
Gibbs, under the holding of the Home Owners Loan case,
could have compelled St. Joseph to give to them sufficient water for the connections. Their applications gave
them a priority to the next sixty connections if water was
or became available. As will be demonstrated below, the
jury not only could have found, but probably would have
been compelled to find that there was surplus water in
the St. Joseph system in quantities more than adequate
to supply the connections asked for by the Gibbs.
The property of St. Joseph had been dedicated to
public use. One person witliin the franchise area had a
right to connections equal to the right of any other person
within that area. If there were not water for both, then
priority of application should control. Yet the trial court
here cancelled the 60 approved applications and gave
the exclusive right to make new connections to the people
of the town. It refused to let the jury determine whether
there was sufficient water for both. Its ruling is that if
a person resides in a town he has a preferential right to
have a drink of water superior to persons residing outside the town; that it is a higher public use for persons
reRiding in the franchise area of St. Joseph (if they will
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.-

incorporate into a town) to haYP water than for the
persons residing outside the town to have water.

'

The cases cited above will not permit such a holding.
The Mono Power case would prohibit the city from condemning the system at all. The East Bay ft'lunicipal
Utility District rase would permit the town to take the
system but would make them carry on the same trust-the same duty-to the territory previously served. The
Pasadena case obligated the city to hold the water in
trust both for the existing users and for those in the
territory served "who may become entitled" to use it.
The contention that the people outside the town could
only be allowed water if it were surplus to the needs of the
town under a. situation such as this was also expressly
denied in the case of Sacramento Municipal Utility District v. Pacific Gas & Electric, 165 P. (2d) 750. In that
case the nature of the burden assumed by a town when it
takes over a public service company rendering service
both within and outside the town is further described. It
there stated that the town's burden is not limited to furnishing service from its surplus water. It must take over
the duties of the public service company and perform
the obligations of the trust it owed, because it had devoted its property to a public service. It must take over
the duties of the public service company to furnish the
territory previously served so far as it is possible to do
so. In this regard the court said :
"One of the contentions advanced by appellant in this connection, to the effect that it is only
the surplus energy that may be used for the service of persons outside the district, does not find
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support in the authorities. It is held that this is
not the theory on which such service may be provided, but it is rather the theory that in taking
over facilities serving another area, the district
must, on principles of fairness and justice, continue the service which was furnished outside the
district, where this can be done efficiently and
economically. 'In these operations the municipality is not selling surplus or excess waters to the
prior users. The purchase of the system is impressed with a trust * * *' Durrant v. City of
Beverly Hills, 39 Cal. App. 2d 133, 137, 102 P. 2d
759, 761.''
There are not a great number of cases dealing with
this subject. It seems to be clearly established that hisofar as facilities devoted solely to the needs of the Town
are concerned it is a higher public use for the Town to
own its own system. For this reason, the principle is
established in the textbooks and in the cases that a town
can condemn a public service corporation which is serving the area embraced by the town. In order for the town
so to do, it must have express legislative authority, but
once granted that authority it does have this power. This
matter is considered in great detail in an annotation in
173 ALR beginning a page 1362. Further along in said
annotation a.t pages 1376-78, the right of a city to condemn a public service corporation which serves people,
both within and without the town area, is described.
A very limited number of cases are there noted, but
uniformly they are to the effect that if the town does
take over a utility which is serving an area outside the
town it must perform that company's public duty to that
territory. The Mono Pou:er Company case is cited along
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with Plainfield Union. Tr ater Company r. Plainfield, 83
New Jersey Law, 332, 86 Atl. 311.

(a) Sf. Joseph co~tld not have withdrawn service
from any of its franchise area by a vohtntary sale or
otherwise.
To further demonstrate the fact that the peoples of
a franchise area do have an interest in the discontinuance
of service, reference is made to that group of cases which
prohibit a public utility from withdrawing service from
particular areas without legislative authority. It is
clear from these cases that persons located in the franchise area had a right to be heard before St. Joseph could
have withdrawn service itself. If it could not have Yo]untarily done so, it is difficult to see upon what principle
service could be withdrawn from the area by eminent
domain proceedings. It was upon this principle that the
users outside the city sought to enjoin the sale of a private water company to Pasadena in the South Pasadena
case supra. The court said that the persons being served
would have an interest which had to be protected. It protected it by permitting the city to buy the system, but
held that the property was imposed with a trust to serve
both existing users and those "who may become entitled"
to service in the future.
The books are full of cases wherein a utility has attempted to withdraw service from a particular area or to
change the nautre of the services rendered. See, for
example, two Utah cases, L. A. and 8. L. R. Company v.
Public Service Commission, 80 Utah 455, 15 P. (2d) 358,
and L. A. and S. L. R. Company v. Public Service Comm,ission, 81 Utah 286, 17 P. (2d) 287.
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The principle is well stated in an early Connecticut
case, Gates v. Boston &; N. Y. Air Line R. Co., 53 Conn.
333, 5 Atl. 695, and in an annotation at 11 ALR 252. In
the Gates case the court said:
'' * * * Having exercised those powers, the corporation has no right, against the will of the state,
to abandon the enterprise, tear up its track, and
sell its rolling stock and other property, and
divide the proceeds among the stockholders. The
possible effects of the exercise of such a claimed
power are utter disaster to the great interests of
the state, certain destruction of private property
in which whole communities, created and existing
upon the faith of the continuous use of the chartered powers, are interested ; and, indeed, the
life of the citizen as well as his property rights
are thus jeopardized. Upon principle it would
seem plain that railroad property once devoted
and essential to public use must remain pledged
to that use, so as to carry to full completion the
purpose of its creation; and that this public right,
existing by reason of the public exigency, demanded by the occasion, and created by the exercise by
a private person of the powers of a state, is
superior to the property rights of corporations,
stockholderB, and bondholders.''

CONCLUSION ON POINT I
The evidence is undisputed that St. Joseph owned
in its own right and leased from McDuff sufficient water
to furnish 105 connections. The evidence is also uncontroverted that St. Joseph had a written contract to use
at a rate of ten cents per thousand gallons the 250 gallon
flow of the Holbrook well. Combined, these water sources
would have furnished a complete water supply for well
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11.:

over 450 connections. At the time of the trial it was stipulated that there were only 64 connections. It is thus crystal clear that there was adequate water under the control
of St. Joseph to furnish water for all of the 60 applications which were made by the Gibbs. The applications
had been made, approved and paid for. The pipeline
extension had been completed, and houses were under
construction before the condemnation suit was brought.
Certainly the Gibbs had established a right to have water
connections which St. Joseph could not have refused.
The water and the property had been dedicated to public
use and were imposed with a public trust. The cases appear to permit the town to condemn the system, but
deny the right of the town to free the property from the
obligations of its previous trust. The Town was obligated
to furnish water and to perform the obligations that St.
Joseph would have had had it retained ownership of the
system. Under the Pasadena case and the others cited,
the obligation of the town was to furnish water to all
existing users outside the town, to those who had established a right to water like the Gibbs, and also to those
who might become entitled to use the water in the future
in the franchise area. The Gibbs are not interested particularly in establishing the principle that all persons in
the franchise area must be served. They base their case
squarely upon the fact that they had connections approved and paid for, that they had made the necessary
pipeline installations. They had existing rights as against
the St. Joseph to the available water of the St. Joseph
system. We think the law is as laid down in the Pasadena
rase, that the Gibbs would be entitled to water, even
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without the approved applications, but certainly in view
of the approved applications the Gibbs had rights which
could not legally be taken.
Since the Town did not condemn the St. Joseph contract to purchase water from the Holbrook well the matter is .left somewhat muddled. Had the Town taken
over all of the water supply of St. Joseph, including its
contract rights to the Holbrook well, then a decision that
the Town was required to serve the Gibbs would have disposed of this case. But since the Town has acquired only
the 27 gallons per minute flow from the springs owned
by St. Joseph, it does not have sufficient water to meet
its existing needs, and of course will in the future be
compelled either to acquire the McDuff water, (which
already has been devoted to public use by St. Joseph) or
the water from the Holbrook well. It seems that the
Town should be prohibited, as we contended, from taking the St. Joseph system at all, unless it can perform
the trust which had been assumed by St. Joseph. By
breaking up the system as it has done, it has rendered it
impossible for the Gibbs to get water. Unless the Town
increases its supply and is obligated then to supply water
for the sixty connections, or unless the system is returned
to St. Joseph, which can continue to perform its trust
the Gibbs cannot be protected. The Gibbs do not care
"'lvhich is done, but it is their desire to procure water for
the sixty connections rather than to have damages for the
taking of their contract rights and severance damages to
their pipeline and housing project.
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POINT II
IF THE PROPERTY OF ST. JOSEPI-I COULD BE
FREED OF ITS OBLIGATION TO SERVE THE
SIXTY CONNECTIONS OF THE GIBBS, THEN IN
ANY EVENT, THE GIBBS WERE ENTITLED TO
COillPENSATION.
There could be no principle which would justify the
termination and avoidance of the Gibbs contract rights,
and since they were destroyed they must be compensated
for. Being property rights, they are protected by the
provisions both of the Federal and State constitutions
which prohibit a taking of property without just compensation. This principle is too well established to need citation of authority.
There is no evidence even to suggest that the Gibbs
did not have a valid contract with St. Joseph for sixty
water connections. There likewise can be do doubt that
those contract rights have been destroyed by the taking of
the property in a suit to which both St. Joseph and the
Gibbs were parties and in which the Gibbs asserted their
rights, but were awarded no interest.

It is a familiar principle in eminent domain proceedings that where several parties have an interest in the
property being taken, their rights must be separately
valued and each must be paid for his interest. See for
example, Lewis on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Sections 716-719. See also 29 C. J. S., Section 236 (b), page
204, wherein the rights of a lessor and lessee, landlord
and tenant, mortgagor and mortgagee, trustee and benefieiary, etc. are discussed. It is there stated that both
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the lessor and the lessee, the landlord and the tenant,
etc. are necessary parties to the condemnation suit, and
that the rights of each must be fixed. Here Gibbs had
a contract interest in the St. Joseph system and were
not only proper parties, but were necessary parties to the
taking of that interest and the termination of their contracts. If the property was to be taken (and we strenuously deny the right of the city to take it free of its
obligations) then this interest of the Gibbs should have
been paid for by someone, and it should have been assessed by this same jury, not by some subsequent or other
jury.
One case which clearly holds that the Gibbs contract
with the utility was a property interest in the property
taken, is the case of Plainfield Unrion Water Company v.
Plainfield, 83 New Jersey Law 332, 86 Atl. 311. The
court there held that one city could not condemn a water
Dystem already devoted to serve several other areas. It
based its holding upon the fact that the statutes were not
broad enough to permit such condemnation. In reaching this conclusion the court discussed the nature of the
rights of these other areas which had contracts with the
utility for service. The court said that by reason of these
contracts the areas had an interest in the system, that
their interest entitled them to water, that the contracts
were unique in th~at they could be specifically enforced
by mandamus to compel a water connection, and that
had the legislature permitted the city to condemn the
utility then the holders of these contract rights would be
rntitled to compensation.
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The principle is no different ht>rP. The Gibbs had
a contract interest with the St. Joseph. Under a letter
dated the 14th day of December, 1945. they submitted an
application for sixty eonnections. (Defendant's exhibit
8) The corporation, by a resolution of its Board of Directors, approved these applications. (R. 199) Thereafter
on December 18, 19-!5, the Gibbs sent a letter acknowledging the connections and gave their check No. 873 for
$800.00 in payment therefore. (Defendant's Exhibit 8)
At that time there was not even the most remote idea
that the system would be condemned. The Town of North
Salt Lake had not yet even been incorporated. Nor was
there any plan afoot to incorporate it. Gibbs simply wanted to develop a housing project and applied to St. Joseph
for -water. If the St. Joseph had not had sufficient water
to supply these connections, then the Gibbs would never
have gotten them, because under no circumstances could
the company have taken away from its existing users to
meet applications for new connections filed by the Gibbs.
It was a public utility under the regulation of the Public
Service Commission, and any apprehension that Gibbs
was going to take away from the other users their right
to use water was indeed far-fetched. He did, however,
establish a priority to the sixty connections into the system. The evidence is clear that there was sufficient
water. The system was delapidated, and part of the
water was wasted, but the flow of water was adequate
if the system were repaired.
There can thus be no doubt that the Gibbs had a
valid contract for sixty connections, that they had paid
$800.00 for them and were obligated to pay an additional
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$400.00. The water was available to serve their needs.
In reliance on these contracts, and pursuant to the
express requirements thereof, the Gibbs proceeded to install a pipeline extension. It is to be noted from their
arrangement with St. Joseph that they were required to
install the pipeline and to transfer it to St. Joseph, after
they had been paid therefor from the revenues from the
sale of water. (R. 199) St. Joseph later relinquished all
of its claim to the pipeline. (R. 223) But the Gibbs did
install the pipeline pursuant to contract and in reliance
on its contract rights. When the town condemned the
system, it should have been compelled in any event to
compensate the Gibbs for the reasonable value of these
contract rights, and as is set out in more detail below,
they should have been allowed severance damages for the
severance of their pipeline and other properties from
the St. Joseph system.
POINT III
SINCE THE GIBBS HAD CONSTRUCTED A PIPELINE EXTENSION PURSUANT TO AN EXISTING
CONTRACT WITH ST. JOSEPH AND MADE
OTHER IMPROVEMENTS, THEY WERE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES WHEN THE PIPELINE EXTENSION WAS SEVERED FROM THE SYSTEM OF
ST. JOSEPH AND THUS LEFT WITHOUT WATER
The Gibbs, in reliance upon an existing contract with
St. Joseph, constructed a pipeline extension at a cost in
excess of $4,000.00. They not only had the approved applications for sixty connections, but the company had
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expressly agreed with the Gibbs that if they would construct a pipeline extension from the St. Joseph pipeline
to their housing project, that they would be reimbursed
therefor by the company from the proceeds from the sale
of water in the Gibbs subdivision. (R. 199) Counsel read
from the corporation minutes, upon the stipulation of the
parties as follows :
"Mr. L. W. Gibbs presented a letter requesting extension of water service to supply the new
homes about to be constructed in Hillside Gardens;
upon a motion of \V ard C. Holbrook this extension
was authorized with the understanding that the
work be done by :Mr. Gibbs, and that the cost of
labor and materials be paid for by L. W. Gibbs,
with the understanding that the said L. W. Gibbs
be refunded all accounts collected for water service and water connections during a period of five
years from the time of the completion of the extension in accordance with the conditions of paragraph 11 of the Rules and Regulations."
Pursuant to that arrangement, Gibbs paid $800.00
for forty of the sixty connections, and by his letter of
December 18, 1945, he agreed to pay for the remaining
twenty connections as the housing construction progressed. (Ex. 8) Gibbs thereupon commenced the construction
of the pipeline system. The evidence is uncontradicted
that he paid $100.00 to A. Z. Richards for engineering
work in laying out the system. ~R. 192) He paid the
Higham Plumbing Company $747.50 on July 14, 1946,
and $817.20 on July 31, 1946, for plumbing supplies and
work shown on two statements introduced as Exhibit 7.
(R. 172) He paid Grant Tuft $775.50 for installation of
other pipelines, the Chytraus Construction Company
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$839.38 for construction work on the pipe](ines and
$900.00 to the Waterworks Equipment Company for
pipe. (R. 189) All of these expenditures were made pursuant to a valid and subsisting contract entered into more
than two years prior to the bringing of this condemnation suit. When the company was stopped by these proceedings from furnishing water, it disclaimed all interest
in the pipeline. (R. 223) So it is clear that the Gibbs
owned the pipelines, that they expended well over $4,000
to construct them, and that they were constructed under
valid, subsisting contracts. As has been demonstrated
above, St. Joseph had under its control sufficient water
to supply in excess of 450 connections, and at the time of
the trial it was supplying only 64, so that had this system
remained under the control of St. Joseph the Gibbs would
have had water for their pipeline, and through the sale
of water would have been reimbursed for their costs of
installing it. Both the contract right which entitled them
to the connections and the investment in the pipeline
system have been totally destroyed and rendered worthless by ,this condemnation suit.
This case must be distinguished from those cases where
members of the general public have constructed improvements on their own land in reliance on the location of
a railroad track or a highway which is later changed.
Such people have no rights for which they can be paid
money damages, if the utility discontinues operation or
the highway is moved to suit the greater public convenience. But such is not the law where the facility is constructed pursuant to a contract with the utility to render
service, and the utility then seeks to withdraw service
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without paying for the value of the improvement. Again
the fact situation is one upon which there has not been
a great deal of litigation. There is, however, an annotation in 23 ALR 555, in which the general rule is given as
stated above. Of course, in no case is the utility permitted simply to abandon service without getting authority
of the regulatory department of the State. This is discussed in detail above with the cases that hold that the
person being served has an interest in continued service,
and that property once devoted to public use can not be
withdrawn from public service, except with legislative
authority. However, in those cases where legislative
authority to withdraw is granted, the utility generally
may discontinue its line without paying its customers
damages because of its abandonment or relocation. The
particular cases covered by the annotation in 23 ALR 555
deal with the change in location of railroad tracks and
facilities. After giving the general rule that damages
can not be recovered by the public at large the annotation
then refers to a group of cases where the service is being
rendered or improvements were installed pursuant to a
contract. In such instances, the courts hold that damages
may be recovered if the service is taken away.
No other rule could be justified either in law or
morals. Where a customer of a public utility which is
obligated by law to render service enters into a firm
contract with that utility under the terms of which the
customer constructs connecting facilities, the utility can
not discontinue service without paying damages to the
customer whose facilities have thus been rendered valueless. The rule waul d be otherwise were there not a con33
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tract, but where, as here, there is a contract and the pipeline was constructed pursuant to it, the cases appear to
hold uniformly that persons in the position of the Gibbs
in this case must be paid damages when their contract!
is confiscated and their investment (J!J'td facilities under
the contract are rendered worthless. It is no different in
principle from a person who leases my farm and pursuant to the lease constructs valuable improvements
thereon. Thereafter a public agency condemns the farm,
destroys the improvements and terminates the lease.
There is no principle under which the condemnor should
be permitted to thus destroy the improvement and the
contract without paying to the lessee the value of the
property thus taken.
In the instant case the property taken consisted only
of the contract rights, which entitled the Gibbs to water
and the connections but in addition damages should have
been assessed because of the destruction of the value of
the property not taken. There should be no doubt that
the Gibbs are entitled to damages, because they were
connected on to the system of St. Joseph pursuant to a
valid contract. They were severed from that system, and
their contract was abbrogated. They are without water
and have a pipeline system constructed at a cost in excess
of $4,000.00, which is now worthless, because there is no
water to fill it. Further, they had started the construction of several homes and had made other expenditures
in connection with their property, all of which are valueless without culinary water. Severance damage should
have been assessed by the jury, and the Gibbs should have
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been compensated therefor by the Town of North Salt
Lake.
(a)

WAS THERE SURPLUS WATER IN
THE SYSTEM~

The contention has been made and undoubtedly will
be made on this appeal that there was not surplus water.
Our position in this regard simply is that the jury could
have found that there was surplus water under the control
of St. Joseph. The Gibbs and St. Joseph tendered special
interrogatories calculated to have the jury determine
whether or not there was surplus water, and whether
or not there was a contract. The court simply held that
as a matter of law the Gibbs had no interest in the
matter and refused to permit the jury to make the determination. We believe that the evidence is so strong on
this point that a jury could not have found otherwise
than that there were valid contracts, that there was surplus water, etc., but we need not go that far. Certainly
it can not be successfully urged that a jury could not
have found from the evidence adduced that there was
surplus water and that the other conditions outlined
above did exist. It is respectfully submitted that if the
system can be taken free of the trust (its obligation to
furnish the territory previously served), then in any
event the Gibbs were entitled to compensation for their
contract rights and severance damages to their pipeline,
homes and other properties.
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POINT IV
IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT THE TOWN TO DISMISS ITS ACTION TO CONDEMN THE SIX
HUNDRED FEET EXTENSION
The Town held possession under an order of immediate occupancy and Gibbs was enjoined from interfering
with the occupancy, all without compensation. In this
regard appellants consider the case of Salt Lake City v.
Moyle, 111 Utah 201, 176 Pac. (2d) 882, to be directly.in
point and controlling. At the time the action was filed
by plaintiff on November 16, 1948, the complaint sought
to condemn 600 feet of pipeline which was owned by the
Gibbs. (R. 4) The complaint asked for immediate occupancy and a hearing was held thereon. The court granted
the order of immediate occupancy, by a minute order on
December 28, 1948, and the written order was filed on
February 7, 1949. (R. 20, 35) In the order of immediate
occupancy Gibbs was enjoined from interfering with the
property described in the co~plaint. This order of occupancy and the injunction continued until after the trial.
At that time the plaintiff indicated that it did not want
to condemn the entire 600 feet, but only 126 feet thereof.
The parties stipulated that the 126 feet which was still to
be taken had a value of $750.00.
The verdict which was submitted to the jury even
had on it the $750.00 item. (P. 125) The judgment which
was finally entered recited that a motion had been made
to dismiss the action as to Lauren W. Gibbs conditionally,
and the court granted to the Town the right to take 126
feet of the Gibbs pipeline if it desired to do so upon condi36
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tion of the Town paying the Gibbs $750.00. The court
then provided in its judgment that the plaintiff did not
need to take any of the pipeline, unless it elected to do so.
It, therefore, permitted the plaintiff to dismiss the action
to take oYer the Gibbs pipeline at the end of the trial and
after the. jury verdict.
The Gibbs had been placed to the expense of defending their rights and proving their damages, and in addition the town had been granted the immediate occupancy
of said pipeline and the Gibbs had been enjoined from
interfering with that occupancy. The trial was had in
September and the minute order on immediate occupancy
was entered in December of the previous year. The Town
therefore, held occupancy of the Gibbs pipeline and the
Gibbs were enjoined from interfering with it for nine
months. The Gibbs had been given no indication during
the trial that the pipeline was not going to be condemned,
and of course made no effort to prove what damage they
had suffered by reason of the order of immediate occupancy. But the case was dismissed without giving the
Gibbs any compensation. If the entire action had been
dismissed before trial the Gibbs could have then brought
their action for damages for the nine months of occupancy, but here the matter was not dismissed until after
the trial. If the Town decided it did not want to take this
particular property, then certainly the Gibbs should have
been awarded damages and this jury should have been
permitted to assess them for the nine months of occupancy by the town. Secondly, After the Gibbs had been
required to go through a three day trial, had been placed
to the expense of employing an attorney, called witnesses,
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etc., to defend against the taking of their property, the
court permitted this order that the town had an election
as to whether it would take the pipe line. Defendants had
to prove its value because it appeared that the line was
to be taken. Certainly the Town should be required to
pay those expenses. In this regard they should have
been compelled to pay the attorney fee as well as t~e
court costs incurred by the Gibbs in defending an action
which the city later decided to dismiss.
POINT V
THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN PERMITTED,
(A) TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE
PROPERTY OF THE GIBBS WAS WITHIN THE
ST. JOSEPH AREA, AND (B) WHETHER OR NOT
THERE WAS SURPLUS WATER TO FULFILL
THE GIBBS CONTRACT FOR NEW CONNECTIONS
Both St. Joseph and the Gibbs requested the court
to permit the jury to answer special interrogatories concerning the availability of water under the Gibbs contract for connections, and whether or not the Gibbs land
was within the St. Joseph franchise area. (R. 68, 70, 71)
These rna tters were of importance in determining the
question of damages to the Gibbs. When the court refused to permit the jury to award the Gibbs any damages
by its refusal to submit defendant's requested ins truetion No. 5. (R. 78), then the question of whether or not
there was surplus water and whether or not the land was
within the franchise area failed too. It is the contention
of the appellants that the jury should have been permitted to find from the evidence actually produced that there
38
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was surplus water, that the Gibbs were within the St.
Joseph franchise area, and that there were valid contract rights held by the Gibbs in the St. Joseph system.
The refusal of the court to submit these matters to a jury
was error, and it should be corrected here, so that on a
re-trial of the damage question these matters can be
brought properly before the jury. Further is was error
to admit the order of the Public Service Commission regarding water availability. The question as to whether
there was sufficient water was for the jury and it would
not be controlled by any determination of that question
by any other agency.
POINT VI
IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT THE CITY TO FURNISH WATER TO SIX USERS AT CITY RATES
THROUGH THE GIBBS PIPELINE WITHOUT
PAYING THE GIBBS THEREFOR.
It should also be noted that the court provided that
6,000 gallons of water per day was to be delivered by the
Town into the Gibbs pipeline for the benefit of six people
who were not parties to the action, and they were given
permission in the action to utilize the Gibbs pipeline to
convey their water from the St. Joseph system to their
own houses. The Gibbs were given no compensation for
this encumbrance placed on their pipeline, and this was
also error. There is nor can be no legal basis upon which
the Town could be granted permission to deliver water
through the Gibbs pipeline to the six individuals named
in the judgment without paying the Gibbs some compensation for the use thereof. The judgment specifically
provided tlu~.t the Town would receive from said six users
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city rates for the use of the water. The Town is thus
given all of the revenue therefrom and the Gibbs pipeline is encumbered by this use, and still the court held
that it was not taken and that the Gibbs were entitled to
no compensation. The order providing for delivery of
the 6,000 gallons per day into the pipeline is shown in the
record at page 127. The right of the city to collect city
rates therefore was prescribed by the court at pages
354-5 of the record, in its oral order and on page 178 of
the written judgment. This order was excepted to, (R.
359) but without avail. Certainly, the city should not be
permitted to collect city rates for furnishing water
through the Gibbs pipeline to users who are strangers to
the Gibbs, but that is the effect of the order. We think it
is tantamount to taking the Gibbs property even though
the court ruled that it was not being taken, and we
respectfully submit that this was error.
CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, the appellants Gibbs contend
that by reason of their contracts with the St. Joseph they
had an interest in the property of the St. Joseph equal
to the right of the six individuals (actual users of water)
whose rights were protected by the court; that this
interest gave them a right to water connections with St.
Joseph, for which they could have used the writ of mandamus to enforce; that the properties of St. Joseph were
imposed with the burden and obligations to honor these
contract rights; and that the Town could not take the
portion of the system necessary to supply those rights
except by assuming the same trust and obligations which
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were imposed upon this property while dedicated to
public use by St. Joseph.
If the court should hold that the Gibbs interest could
be taken without any obligations, then these appellants
contend that the termination of their contracts and the
severance of their pipeline system and their home developments from a source of culinary water was a taking
of property without compensation. I caution the court
not to misunderstand us as basing this contention upon
the mere fact that the Gibbs were in the St. Joseph Franchise area. Their position is much stronger than that. It
is based upon the fact that they had firm existing contracts with St. Joseph, that those contracts were terminated by the taking. Secondly, the improvements which
were made were also made pursuant to contracts with
St. Joseph, and it is upon the basis of these contract
rights that the appellants contend that they had an interest which was terminated and taken without compensation.
Further, the property of the Gibbs was occupied by
the Town from December until September, and the Town
furnished water through the pipe line to six water users
and took the revenues therefrom without compensating
the Gibbs. They should not have been permitted to dis-:miss their action without compensating the Gibbs for damages during the time the property was occupied by the
Town and for their costs in defending an action which
was dismissed at the end of the trial. Finally, the order
permitting six people to continue to take water through
the Gibbs pipeline, and permitting the Town to receive
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the revenues therefrom, imposed a burden on the Gibbs
property which is tantamount to taking it without compensation. On these bases, we submit that judgment of
the court must be reversed. Upon the uncontradicted
evidence regarding Mr. Gibbs contracts the court should
adjudge and dete-rmine the rights of Gibbs to connections
without the necessity of a new trial. If, the court should
determine that the Gibbs are not to be protected' as to
connections, then the damages must be assessed for the
taking.

Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE
Attorneys for Appellants.
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